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ABSTRACT 
 
Looking at the arithmetic, in May 2004 there will only be six large member states among 25. These six 
large states will, however, account for roughly three-quarters of Union’s population. This is a different 
situation from the original European Communities for which the institutions were designed. The 
Convention, despite progress, faced unprecedented divisions over the balance of power as proposed in 
the draft Constitutional Treaty, provoking a split between large and small members. This paper tries to 
explore the stances taken by the small countries of the Union on issues that seem to be 
overwhelmingly fundamental to them – the question of the Council presidency and the question of the 
size, composition and legitimacy of the Commission. It concludes that the smaller countries have 
greater gains to make by coordinating their positions where their interests converge, so that the current 
‘tyranny of the Small’ can avoid becoming a ‘directoire of the Big’. 
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Rien n'est possible sans les hommes, 
rien n'est durable sans les institutions. (Jean Monnet) 
 
The Convention, despite progress on many important issues, faced unprecedented divisions over some 
of the most fundamental questions of the balance of power in the EU of 25 or more members. The 
diverging stances have been presented as a clash between the smaller and larger member states of the 
Union. As we cannot naturally assume that the positions taken by the smaller countries are the same 
on all of the issues (nor can this be assumed for the larger countries), for those issues where there seem 
to be major disagreements – i.e. the institutional questions – this rule largely applies.  
Looking at the arithmetic, in May 2004, there will only be six large member states (Poland included) 
out of 25. The large states will, however, account for roughly three-quarters of the Union’s population. 
This is an entirely different situation from the original European Communities for which the 
institutions were designed. Although the respective major institutional players underwent some 
changes in the period, no major reshuffling of power took place. Since then, the number of small 
countries has increased and the effect will be highlighted even more after ten new countries join in 
May next year. That is why attempts are being made to redesign the institutions to suit a different 
Europe from the one we have known until recently. 
The issue was recently exacerbated in the endgame politics of the Convention. On the one hand, the 
Praesidium and its chairman Valérie Giscard d´Estaing consistently refused to incorporate the 
proposals of the small countries or come up with a compromise solution until some changes occurred 
in the final stages. The Convention boss even acknowledged to some European media
1 that one should 
not naturally assume that the states are equal. This provoked an allergic reaction and counter-proposals 
from the vast majority of smaller countries in the Convention. The compromise of the Convention was 
presented by Mr Giscard to the European Council in Thessaloniki on 20 June 2003. Although the 
Convention managed to come up with one single proposal at the end, room was left for bargaining at 
the following IGC. There is a risk that the ambition of the Convention is going to be watered down 
and the EU is going to end up in a similar institutional muddle as it did after Nice. 
This paper tries to explore the stances taken by the small countries of the Union on two issues that 
seem to be overwhelmingly fundamental to them – the question of the Council presidency and the 
question of the size, composition and legitimacy of the Commission.  
Council presidency reform – Who will hold the sceptre? 
Council reform seems to be one of the main issues addressed by the Convention where the cleavage 
between the smaller and larger EU member states (both current and candidates) clearly emerged.
2 
While those advocating the current proposals in the draft Constitution creating the post of a permanent 
European Council chair (UK, France, Italy, Spain, Germany, Poland, Sweden and Denmark) argue 
with the need to increase the efficiency of the Council, the opponents emphasise the necessity of 
sticking to equality between members. On the other hand, all the states feel the need for some kind of 
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Council reform, as it is one of the most unstable and vulnerable institutions.
3 Taking into account its 
ever-changing composition, the Council – unlike the Commission or the European Parliament – is not 
vested with a clear-cut mandate, which makes it dependent on the current political situation in the 
individual member states.
4 
The Council is the EU institution most closely representing the intergovernmental element of the 
Union. The small countries by far do not have the same views of what role should be taken by this 
body – some tend to favour a stronger position of the Council (e.g. Estonia). Others like Belgium, the 
Netherlands or the Czech Republic are inclined to take a more balanced approach, with an equally 
strong role for the Commission and the European Parliament. But this is largely because of the current 
political representation – it is quite likely that if the opposition was in power in the Czech Republic, 
for example, the picture would look completely different and the country would find itself much more 
aligned with the British and Scandinavian positions. Over the question of the Council presidency, 
however, a small-large cleavage pattern is quite obvious. 
The first observation we can make clearly is that an absolute majority of smaller member states 
insisted on the preservation of the status quo in terms of the current rotating presidency system or at 
least envisaged the preservation of some sort of rotation.
5 Denmark and Sweden were the only notable 
exceptions, which may be explained by the fact that these countries have a tendency to favour an 
intergovernmental approach. The idea put forward in the draft Constitution envisages a different 
system of a permanent president or chair of the European Council for the period of two and half years, 
renewable once. Let us now explore the main concerns of the smaller countries.  
Internal EU agenda-setting 
The smaller member states viewed the rotating presidency as one of the main preconditions for 
keeping the balance between the big and the small countries. The presidency is one of the occasions 
where the smaller member states can clearly grasp the EU agenda and manage it. It also gives them an 
opportunity to give an additional impetus to development in the EU. The fact that a country is seen as 
the one running the EU, even though for a limited period, is important in the eyes of its own citizens.
6 
Especially if the presidency is generally considered to be a successful one, it helps to increase the 
overall popularity of the EU in a particular country. This point should not be underestimated, 
particularly in relation to the smaller newcomers as it can play an important role in the increased 
visibility of such a country in the European polity as well as in closer identification with the Union 
among its citizens. 
On the other hand, the role of the presidency must not be overestimated either. Nowadays, the 
presiding country can add some of its priorities to the overall EU agenda, but to a large extent this is a 
self-driven process.
7 
It also inherently brings some dangers when a country comes up with an ambitious plan but its 
successors in the presidential capacity are not able to pursue it with as much vigour. Two recent 
examples of this situation are: the Finnish presidency that came up with the Tampere Scoreboard in 
Justice and Home Affairs or the Portuguese presidency that invented the Lisbon agenda. The outcomes 
of these ambitious plans have so far been quite limited. One of the reasons is that countries switching 
each half a year in EU leadership do not have enough courage or ambition to aggressively pursue these 
long-term goals but rather carry on by necessity. There is simply not enough time to negotiate any 
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substantial shifts forward. This could pose a potential problem for the overall dynamics of the EU 
integration process. 
The role of the presidency can be crucial as that of a broker and deal facilitator between particular 
groups of countries within the EU on various issues. Nevertheless, as experience has shown many 
times, this is not always the case. Let us take a recent example of the Danish presidency. There is no 
doubt that for the Danes, finishing the enlargement negotiations with ten candidate countries was 
number one on the agenda. The role that the presidency played in making the final deal, however, was 
not crucial. It is doubtful whether it would have been possible to reach a deal in Copenhagen in the 
absence of the prior Franco-German agreement made in Brussels in October, which was the real 
driving force behind the deal.  
Another fact that speaks against the six-month rotating presidency comes with the implications of the 
enlargement. If the current system is to be maintained, it would mean that each country would hold the 
presidency once in every 13 years. Given the limited time scope, no one can really hope that a country 
would be able to influence EU development in any substantive way. Also the symbolism becomes less 
important here as the country holding the presidency will be just one of many running the EU. Another 
argument against keeping the rotating presidency is the fact the politicians and the civil servants 
working during one presidency will be replaced more often than every 13 years. The institutional 
memory of the Council would then be shorter than the time-span of the rotating system after 
enlargement.  
Why then are the smaller states so anxious about keeping the current system if most of the arguments 
speak against it? There are several explanations. The first is that the current system works and is 
highly predictable, albeit with many reservations. With a system of a permanent chair, no one can 
really say at the moment what would happen with the inter-institutional equilibrium. It is almost 
inevitable that an administrative apparatus would emerge around the president that could potentially 
rival the European Commission which is, as we explain later, thought to be the best friend of smaller 
countries. They usually support the Community method and would therefore like to see even the 
strategic direction emerging from the Commission rather than from the Council. This stance, however, 
leads to further questions of democratising, legitimising and perhaps even politicising the Commission 
for these tasks and whether the EU is moving more towards intergovernmental or supranational 
political finality. This issue is discussed later in the paper. 
When we consider the legitimacy of streamlining the strategic direction the EU wants to have, we 
have to pose the same question in relation to the permanent Council chair. The position could 
potentially develop into a highly influential and powerful one. Will the president be accountable only 
to his or her counterparts in the European Council? That could be quite worrying as the EU leaders 
tend to behave very differently at the summits, often forgetting that they have their governments, 
parliaments and voters behind them. This lack of accountability is a serious concern. On the other 
hand, the point that is sometimes mentioned – that the Council chair will only listen to the large 
countries – does not have to worry the small ones so much. There will be more small countries than 
large ones, and thus more candidates for the Council chair emerging from this category.
8 Furthermore, 
the newly proposed qualified majority voting (QMV) system would help to assure they cannot be 
outvoted by the ‘Big Six’ in the bid.  
Role in the external relations of the Union 
For the EU, the one thing that is often stressed is that the current system does not provide for enough 
continuity and efficiency in running the EU foreign policy and leads to an insufficient visibility of the 
EU in the world. That is probably true. Thus, the question is whether adopting the position of a 
permanent chair would make EU foreign policy more visible in the world as well as more efficient. 
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The Convention President Valery Giscard d´Estaing stressed that the recent Iraq crisis and the 
resulting deep divisions within Europe proved the necessity of having a permanent president. Draft 
Art. I-21, para. 2 of the Constitution goes along with this, stipulating: “the President of the European 
Council shall at his or her level and in that capacity ensure the external representation of the Union on 
issues concerning its common foreign and security policy, without prejudice to the responsibilities of 
the Union Minister for Foreign Affairs”.
9 This could be interpreted in at least two ways. The first one 
is that the permanent president will, in fact, create the EU foreign policy. Yet it is highly doubtful that 
the EU heads of state and government will be able to confer this competence on a single person. The 
other interpretation is that the president will be, in the realm of foreign policy, just a spokesperson of 
the European Council (at the very best) and a broker between the heads of state on foreign policy 
issues (as in EU internal affairs). This may lead to some doubt as to what the role of the European 
foreign minister would be, which is discussed later in the paper. The proposal put forward by the 
Presidium in this respect is weak, because it does not come up with a more precise job description for 
the permanent president in the area of foreign policy, apart from this very broad and inconsistent 
formulation in the draft Art. I-21. 
Given the virtual non-existence of a common EU stand on some of the crucial foreign and security 
policy issues, it is highly unlikely that the heads of state and government will manage to appoint a 
person who will be able to exercise a sufficient influence over them and speak for the EU in the 
international arena. Could such a person be a counterpart to Presidents Vladimir Putin or George W. 
Bush? Probably not, given that he or she could not make the European foreign policy, yet would be the 
sole European Council spokesperson. Even more importantly, he or she would not enjoy political 
legitimacy as strong as that of Mr Putin or Mr Bush, which will make it difficult for him or her to be 
on equal footing with them. The potential competition with the Commission president, who will be – 
whether we want it or not – vested with some sort of external representation powers, is also more than 
evident.  
Most of the smaller countries are in favour of seeing a genuine, common position on many foreign 
policy issues. This is because for smaller countries it is easier to reach a common stand in the area of a 
foreign policy, as they generally do not have global interests but particular ones. But even with regard 
to their particular concerns, they hardly ever have enough structural power to push them through. 
Influencing issues through EU structures can be one of the ways of gaining this structural power. This 
can explain why some of the small countries would like to see a stronger role for the Commission in 
foreign policy. If not, they can at least rely on affecting the issues during their presidency. 
Undoubtedly the creation of a permanent Council chair would make such efforts by smaller states 
much more difficult to achieve. 
European foreign minister – What relation to the Council president? 
It is often stressed that one of the ways to make the foreign policy more efficient is to create a sort of 
permanent post for running the EU external relations that would replace the current ‘troika’ system. 
Small countries generally assume that this task could be performed by the double-hatted European 
foreign minister (EFM), and that is why they supported the initiative in the Convention. The only 
problem that remains is the possible encroachment on the position of the Council president.  
The views on the institutional position of a European foreign minister, however, differ. Some 
countries would prefer to have this position based solely in the Commission (Finland, Belgium); 
others would prefer the EFM to be based in the Council (Estonia). The current proposal in Art. I-27 
stipulates that the foreign minister will be appointed by the Council in concert with the Commission 
president, thus creating a double-hatted post as the foreign minister would also be one of the vice-
presidents of the Commission.
10 It seems that this could be a sensible compromise for smaller 
countries, the majority of whom do not favour shifting the external representation of the Union 
completely to the Council. Still, many questions remain open in the proposal. For instance, as a 
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member of the Commission, will the foreign minister also have to be approved by the European 
Parliament? Some may say no, as he or she will be representing the Council and the European 
Parliament does not have much say in the common foreign and security policy (CFSP). On the other 
hand, he or she will be responsible for the Union’s external action in a much broader sense than the 
current High Representative, including the external relations falling within the Community pillar; thus 
scrutiny from the European Parliament would be logical. Yet to what extent will he or she be bound by 
the collegiality in the Commission?  
With relation to the previous discussion, the post of the European foreign minister would not be 
entirely equal to heads of state and government, thus his or her influence in formulating and 
pronouncing on European foreign policy issues will be even more limited than that of the president. 
The current draft of the Constitution, however, states that he or she should conduct the Union’s 
common foreign and security policy (Art. I-27 para. 1) and chair the Foreign Affairs Council (Art. I-
23 para. 2).
11 The first part of this job description creates further confusion about the relationship 
between the foreign minister and the European Council chair. Some efficient division of powers 
between these two functions could still be envisaged – while the foreign minister would run EU 
foreign policy on a day-to-day basis, the European Council president would speak at the head of state 
level, i.e. as counterpart to Mr Bush or Mr Putin. 
One must not forget, however, that the problem lies elsewhere. Neither the permanent European 
Council chair, nor the European foreign minister will be able to make much difference, unless the 
system of decision-making in CFSP is radically changed to QMV or at least some other more efficient 
form of constructive abstention. It may bring less confusion for the EU counterparts on the world stage 
but will hardly make in itself the EU foreign policy more efficient or visible in a wider world. But 
there are not enough countries that are ready to concede to this step at the moment, and certainly not 
all of the small ones.  
The other important step – and not necessarily an easier one to make – is to try to identify genuine 
European foreign policy interests on which all of the 25 countries can agree upon (or at least not 
obstruct). Europe needs to find the lowest common denominator in foreign policy in areas where it can 
make difference, rather than try to be a global policeman while its foreign policy is still being 
shaped.
12 It is certain that such an interest can be found, most probably in the immediate environment 
of the Union. In the draft Constitution there is even a specific title on it (Title VIII), and thus we can 
presume it will receive ‘privileged’ treatment. The first EU-run corps in Bosnia and Macedonia is an 
example of this. In addition to the Balkans, other areas can be considered, such as the Southern 
Mediterranean, the Middle East, Ukraine and Russia. 
Thus the permanent EU president is not much of an advantage to smaller countries, either in foreign 
policy or in internal business. It may bring some slight increase in continuity into the EU’s external 
representation, but will not make much difference towards driving the EU strategically. Even those 
countries that support the permanent president do not have the same ideas about his/her job description 
– while the French would like to give him or her a strong role, potentially developing into the Union 
president, others such as the British or the Scandinavians (Denmark, Sweden) would rather like to see 
him or her as a representative figure.
13 For the time being, the president is likely just to ‘chair’ 
European Council sessions. 
It is surprising, that the small countries that are so very opposed to it do not come up with any strong 
and reasonably argued counterproposals, as most governments agree that the current system needs 
revision. The first really courageous initiative was tabled by the Benelux countries in their offer to 
agree to the permanent chair in return for the Commission president chairing the General Affairs 
Council (GAC).
14 But this sounds like an attempt to make the sort of trade-off that we know about 
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from Nice. Many more innovative proposals could have been made by smaller countries opposing the 
permanent president, ranging from the double-hatting of the Council and Commission presidents to the 
redesign of the rotating presidency so that it is more effective, strategic-thinking and yet representative 
of different groups of countries in the Union and maintains their equal share in guiding the EU. These 
proposals have already appeared but they were not taken up or further elaborated upon by small 
countries. For instance, in one of the early stages of deliberations, the Czech government adopted the 
idea of having a double-hatted president, which was then turned to a team presidency and then to 
maintaining the status quo. Instead of this, the small countries allowed this point to be hijacked by the 
large ones.  
Unfortunately, it is too late to argue this in the Convention. The only chance for the small countries is 
to make a strong push during the IGC. Given the fact that it will be run by a country whose 
government favours the current proposal, this may prove to be as difficult as it was with the president 
of the Convention. 
European Commission reform 
The size – Will everybody have his man or woman in Brussels? 
Within a fragmented and relatively blurred inter-institutional framework, the Commission plays 
multiple roles (Art. 211, TEC), ranging from initiating the legislative process to ensuring respect for 
the Treaty and derived legislation, to enacting executive measures and to supervising policy 
implementation. Moreover, the Commission is essential for ensuring the overall consistency of policy 
developments at the European level and for the conciliation of divergent national and institutional 
interests. The effectiveness of the Commission in carrying out its core task largely depends on 
constructive relations with the other actors involved, namely the Council of the EU, the European 
Parliament (‘the Holy Trinity’) and national administrations.
15  
The importance of the debate on the role of the Commission in the future institutional architecture of 
the EU is more than relevant from the perspective of small countries. There are at least two arguments 
that speak in favour of this statement:  
-  The Nice negotiations resolved the question of the composition of the Commission only partially. 
It seemed to be a starting point for undertaking all other necessary institutional reforms, especially 
those concerning the intergovernmental Council and the European Parliament. During the 
negotiations, however, the reform of the Commission remained in the shadow of other Amsterdam 
leftovers, especially that of the redistribution of votes in the Council, to which all member and 
applicant states attached much greater importance. 
-  With the exceptions of Poland and Romania, all the candidate countries are small states. Thus, not 
only will the fifth enlargement almost double the membership of the Union, it will also, above all, 
increase the number of small states. 
European integration has always included large and small members. The divergence of interests 
between them was a reality that the European Community has had to take into account since the 
beginning of the integration process and is a reality that the EU has to take into consideration as well.
16 
In order to understand why the composition of the Commission is so important for the small countries, 
it is important to review the circumstances under which it emerged as a very good ally of smaller 
member states in the Union. 
To prevent the predominance of larger states over smaller ones, the ‘founding fathers’ of the European 
Coal and Steal Community had to comply with the demands of small states (Benelux) to create an 
additional, intergovernmental body next to the supranational High Authority, owing to the fear by the 
small states that the High Authority would merely protect the interests of larger ones. In addition, the 
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voting arrangements in the Council were made in favour of small states to ease their concerns about 
joining their larger neighbours in the supranational community. 
In the framework of the European Economic Community and Euratom, centrality in the institutional 
setting had been shifted from the Commission to the Council. Because of the enforcement of the 
majority voting principle in the Council,
17 smaller states paradoxically realised their interests could be 
better pursued through a stronger role of the Commission and through the Community method.
18 In the 
intermediate period, the Luxembourg compromise
19 (since 1966) represented a side step in voting 
arrangements, and returned to unanimity voting, in which all states, small and large, had the 
opportunity to veto a decision and were thus placed on the equal footing. It is also in the context of the 
Luxembourg compromise (where the larger states were not worried about the impact of enlargement), 
that a change emerged in the relative voting power in the Council between smaller and larger states in 
favour of the former, especially through their ability to create a blocking minority. 
The community method, on which the process of integration has been based since the Rome treaties, 
can be described as suitable for current and future small EU member states. The importance of this 
method is most obvious in relation to the core Commission’s competence as an exclusive legislative 
initiator. According to the founding treaties, the Commission has the exclusive task of ensuring that 
legislative proposals are in the interest of the whole Community, which means in the interest of small 
and large states.
20 This task was assigned to the Commission as a necessary compensation for the 
enforcement of the majority voting principle in the Council,
21 which, unsurprisingly has often led to 
the out-voting of some states. Furthermore, because of the weighted-voting in the Council, the 
probability of out-voting smaller states had been greater than that of the larger ones. To ensure that the 
process of integration would not be hampered by the dissatisfaction of out-voted states, it was 
necessary to create a mechanism through which the interests of all parties would be considered. As 
Temple Lang and Gallagher noted, “To make sure that the Commission would act in the interests of 
all, the Commission’s independence and its composition, representing the whole Community, were 
guaranteed. All this was, and is, needed to make majority voting acceptable”.
22 This is the main reason 
why, according the Community method, the Commission and not the European Parliament was given 
the competence of sole legislative initiator, as it would be considered more logical from the 
perspective of domestic political systems. 
Strengthening the role of the Commission means reinforcing the Community method; while on the one 
hand this filters out the unilateral pursuit of national interests, on the other hand – which is equally 
important from the standpoint of candidate countries – it tends to generate solidarity-oriented 
outcomes. The Commission itself proposed some suggestions on how this method could be revived in 
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the White paper on European Governance,
23 published in July 2001. These suggestions included, to 
mention just few: the simplification of legislative acts, the possibility to withdraw proposals in the 
event of inter-state bargaining, a strengthening of the executive role and the elimination of national 
committees in the comitology procedure. Obviously, all these proposals are aimed at enhancing the 
Commission’s role. 
The Commission is aware of the fact that under qualified majority voting in the Council it will be 
more difficult to find approval for its legislative initiatives. At the same time, it seems to be pressed 
between the influence of larger states and the aspirations of the European Parliament to strengthen its 
legislative role. Any limitation of the Commission’s legislative competence that the European 
Parliament is striving for would lead to the increase of power of the larger states and would 
consequently ruin the established inter-institutional balance and weaken the Community method.
24 
The other reason why the role of the Commission is so important lies in the so-called ‘democratic 
deficit’. As Temple Lang and Gallagher have stated: “[T]he deficit in transparency and accountability 
in the EU does not lie with the Commission, but with the Council. The executive power in the EU has 
increased and parliamentary power decreased because Governments meet behind closed doors and 
make agreements on both constitutional matters and on legislation”.
25 The feedback mechanism over 
the decisions they take with respect to European issues is quite limited. In many EU countries the 
Parliaments do not actually care too much about what their government is negotiating in Brussels (the 
notable exception being the Danish Folketinget). Notably the ministers are nominated by their 
governments and are not chosen by their national parliaments. Thus, for European issues they are 
accountable neither to their national parliaments nor to the European Parliament.  
Thus, it is not surprising that small states in the future inter-institutional architecture advocate a strong 
Commission, capable of representing the general interests of the Union and above all able to 
counterbalance the power of larger states in the Council. From the perspective of the accession 
countries, the positive experience of the accession process so far should not be neglected. The 
Community method has facilitated enlargement and enabled accession countries to overcome political 
factors and bilateral prerequisites that are not directly connected with the enlargement process itself 
(such as the dispute on property restitution between Slovenia and Italy).
26 It is also a model that 
respects the sovereignty of newly established states. 
Regarding this core competence of the Commission, it is thus necessary for all states to be represented 
in this organisation. The provisions of the Treaty of Nice for the time being take into account such a 
composition, but provide for a change when membership finally reaches 27. It concluded that when 
the number of member states reaches 27, the Commission will be reduced to less than the number of 
the member states – each member state will no longer have its own commissioner and thus the 
Commission will not be fully representative. The consequences of this shift could be serious: states not 
represented by a commissioner could claim not to be obliged to fulfil the decisions agreed by the 
Commission and this may have detrimental effects on the pace of further integration. As one expert 
observer has noted, “at any given time there could be several member states which […] would not be 
represented in any sense in the Commission. They could be unwilling to accept what the Commission 
has proposed, or, more seriously, what the Commission may have done within the limits of the powers 
which the Commission itself is authorised to exercise”.
27 
                                                             
23 See European Commission (2001). 
24 Temple Lang and Gallagher (2002) noted that “The erosion of the Community method tends to favour the 
larger member states, which would gain influence from the move towards inter-governmentalism. The 
Commission was created primarily to safeguard the interests of the Union as a whole and to be thoroughly aware 
of minority interests so as to justify majority voting. Under the Treaty it was given a status that was and is 
unique in international law and practice.
 This was never explained in the EC/EU Treaties and the result is that 
many Europeans do not know why the Community was designed as it was.” 
25 See Temple Lang and Gallagher (2002). 
26 See Brinar and Svetličič (1999). 
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There are some alternatives to such a position, advocated mainly by the large states, because they all 
seek in some ways to ensure the preponderance of their position. The most widely advocated solutions 
are: rotation (which, according to some countries, should be limited only to smaller states); 
classification of portfolios according to their importance; and the hierarchy of commissioners (junior 
and senior). The latter two options both have the undeclared intention that the most important DGs and 
posts would remain in the hands of the larger states. None of these alternatives are satisfactory for the 
small states. 
Despite the most obvious arguments by the proponents of the view that the Commission, as an 
independent and impartial body, does not need to be fully representative (one commissioner per 
member state) because it pursues the Community’s interest and should not reflect national interests, 
the reality shows a rather different picture. We should distinguish between the Commission as a 
supranational organisation and its more intergovernmental nature, in which the commissioners act as a 
link between the Commission and the nation states. Despite the principle of their independence and 
impartiality, it is a tacit rule that commissioners do represent member states in the way that they 
observe and then mediate which legislative proposals are politically acceptable in their respective 
capitals and which ones are not. At the same time, they represent the channel of communication for 
the requirements of Commission to the member states. This makes preparing legislative drafts an 
indispensable part of the process. 
A reasonable argument in favour of equal representation in the Commission stresses “a need for 
someone to personify ‘the Union’ in each member state and to convey a European message in the 
national media and in the respective national languages. Although a vision of the European interest 
cannot be the result of the addition of national interest, it is important that the institution possessing 
the monopoly of legislative initiative in the vast majority of policy areas is able to take national 
specifics and sensitivities into account. Having one commissioner per member state is, at least in 
theory, the best guarantee that this actually happens.”
28 Greater consideration of national interests by 
the Commission was also demanded by member states themselves, which resulted, inter alia, in the 
incorporation of the comitology procedure regarding the single market legislation. The possibility of 
non-compliance with the Commission’s decisions in the realm of its executive function, shared with 
the Council, and its legal function (as a guardian of the legal framework), is also highly probable 
under such system. Although it is true that in the executive and legal spheres the representation of all 
states is not as necessary as in the legislative sphere, it would nevertheless support its legitimacy. 
The Commission has four quite distinct kinds of powers. Apart from its basic role as the independent 
and sole policy- and legislation-proposing institution, it also performs tasks that cannot be carried out 
by the Council or the Parliament: the power to negotiate international agreements on the basis of the 
mandate of the Council; the power to make decisions on the compatibility of state measures with 
Community law; and, the power to bring member states before the Court of Justice if they do not fulfil 
their obligations under the treaties. For these reasons, the Commission must stay equally independent 
of all the member states and must be fully representative of all of them. Only in that way can it fulfil 
its central roles of preparing measures in the interests of the whole Union, of safeguarding the acquis 
communautaire and of representing the Community/Union. These are much more important than its 
‘executive’ role in the narrow sense.  
Regardless of the fact that the strong position of small states to preserve their own commissioner is 
watered down by the present proposal of the draft Constitution, acceptance of this part of the 
Constitutional Treaty could have negative effects on the process of integration as such. Indeed it may 
contribute to the widening of the democratic deficit.  
The election of the Commission president – decreasing the democratic gap but weakening the 
Commission? 
As explained previously, the Commission is often referred to as being the best friend of the smaller 
member states, at least in theory. This is based on the assumption that the Commission, as a guardian 
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of the Community interest, would not take undue respect of interests other than the ones of the Union 
as a whole. It is beyond the scope of this paper to examine whether this is really the case, therefore this 
paper is based on the assumption that it is in the interest of the smaller member states to have a 
stronger role for the Commission. One way of clarifying the Commission’s legitimacy, it is assumed, 
is by increasing the democratic legitimacy of the president of the Commission.
29  
According to the present system, the European Council, acting by a qualified majority, nominates the 
person it intends to appoint as president of the Commission (Art. 214 TEC). The European Parliament 
then approves the nomination by an absolute majority (Art. 198 TEC). If a majority is not obtained, 
the procedure has to be repeated. The other members of the Commission are nominated by the 
Council, and then the Commission, as a body, is subject to a vote of approval by the European 
Parliament. After approval, the Council appoints the president and the other members of the 
Commission. 
In the Convention proposal, the president of the Commission shall be elected by the European 
Parliament.
30 According to draft Art. I-26 of the proposal, the European Council, deciding by qualified 
majority, puts forward its candidate for the presidency of the Commission. When nominating a 
candidate, the European Council shall take into account the elections to the European Parliament. The 
nominated candidate shall then be elected by the Parliament by a majority of its members. If the 
majority support of the Parliament is not received, the European Council shall within one month put 
forward a new candidate. Furthermore, the president and the nominated commissioners, as a body, 
shall be approved by the European Parliament. Thus, two new elements are added in the proposal 
compared with the present system.  
First, according to the proposal the European Parliament will elect the Commission president. 
Compared with the present system the proposal does not, in fact, change the position of the European 
Parliament since only one candidate is put forward to the Parliament. Thus no options, other than 
approval and non-approval, are open to the Parliament. An election usually means that there are 
several options, at least in democratic, multiparty systems. The Parliament can, of course, choose not 
to elect the candidate but this would only mean that another one-option election would be made within 
one month. So, instead of approving the nominated person, as is the case now, the European 
Parliament will elect the nominated person. Will this improve the democratic legitimacy of the 
president? Since the Parliament will not have any options, the proposal seems to be far from 
satisfactory in this regard. If the democratic legitimacy is supposed to be strengthened, the Parliament 
should at least be given a choice between several candidates. Nevertheless, the proposal changes the 
institutional balance symbolically, by explicitly stating that the European Parliament, and not the 
Council, elects the president of the Commission.
31  
Second, the proposal states that the European Council, when nominating the candidate, shall take into 
account the elections to the European Parliament. It is difficult to foresee what this will actually mean 
since no qualification is made regarding this in the proposal. It seems as if the European Council can, 
in fact, disregard the election to the European Parliament. Therefore the proposal does not imply any 
significant change of the nomination procedure or the legitimacy of the Commission president. 
It should also be noted that the Commission would still be responsible to the Parliament according to 
the Convention proposal (Art. I-26 para. 3), which stipulates that the Parliament may pass a censure 
motion on the Commission. If such a motion is passed, the members of the Commission must all 
resign (see also Art. 201, TEC).  
Is the proposal then in line with the interests of the smaller states? Some of the states did want the 
Parliament to elect the Commission president, for example Austria, Greece, France, Germany, 
Belgium, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic and the Netherlands. Others wanted to keep status quo, such as 
Sweden, Finland, Portugal, UK, Estonia and Spain. Ireland and Denmark supported the model of an 
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electoral college to elect the president of the Commission. Slovakia supported the idea of a super-
majority and Malta supported the idea of a congress of national parliamentarians to elect the 
president.
32 Looking at the proposed amendments submitted by some of the representatives of the 
smaller states to the Convention, the positions were in some cases different.
33 For example, the 
Swedish representative suggested that the national parliaments and the European Parliament should 
elect the candidate. The Danish representatives suggested that an electoral college should elect the 
president out of a list of at least three candidates. The Irish representative also proposed that the 
national parliaments should be involved in the election process. The Cypriot and Portuguese 
representatives and some of the Finnish representatives proposed a list of at least three candidates to 
be put forward to the European Parliament. The Greek representatives proposed that the political 
groups of the European Parliament should put forward the candidates. The Slovakian representatives 
supported the proposal but suggested that a three-fifth majority of the votes in the Parliament should 
be required. As one can see, the member states were split regarding this issue. The dividing line, 
though, was not between small and large member states; instead it seems as if the division fell between 
traditionally so-called ‘federalist’ states and states favouring intergovernmental cooperation.  
The election of the president by a majority in the European parliament has some drawbacks.
34 It is 
sometimes alleged that the election of the Commission president will lead to a greater politicisation of 
the Commission. This could be a problem, first because the Commission would not be able to exercise 
some of its strongly apolitical tasks as a purely administrative body (e.g. in competition policy), and 
second because it would depend more on the political composition of the European Parliament than it 
does now and hence could be more vulnerable to the possible motion of censure. The fears are, 
however, quite unfounded. The real politicisation would only come about if the political fractions in 
the European Parliament nominate their candidates. But this does not seem to be a very likely option 
as no one is strongly advocating it. Furthermore, it must be borne in mind that any system basically 
assumes that the Commission president will be elected in some concert between the European Council 
and the European Parliament and the composition of the Council does not necessarily have to 
correspond with that of the European Parliament.  
Another problem with the proposed system is a low turnout in European elections, which cannot at the 
moment provide much more legitimacy for electing the Commission president. Yet it may be the 
election of the Commission president that will increase citizens´ interest in the role of the European 
Parliament.
35 Supposing that the electorate will see the election of the Commission president as a 
natural outcome of the European Parliament elections, they will finally see it as fulfilling one of the 
main roles that any Parliament actually has – that of giving the mandate to the ‘government’. The 
intergovernmentalists are likely to fear this step, as it would shift the system towards what could 
become a classical parliament-government relationship. This would further have to be accompanied by 
some measures that will make this procedure more visible, for instance, bringing the investiture of the 
new Commission upon the European Parliament elections.  
Another option proposed by some states is the election of the Commission president by national 
parliaments or by an electoral college consisting of national and European parliamentarians. The 
system could be based on the population criteria, as reflected in the number of seats in the European 
Parliament, which would determine the share of the vote given to each national MP. In order to ensure 
a fair representation, the over-representation of smaller member states should be allowed. Such system 
would at the same time indirectly enhance the role of national parliaments. But if this is the case, it 
would very much weaken the role of the European Parliament. It would also create a slightly awkward 
situation if the Commission president or the Commission as a whole were to be elected by a body 
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different to the one who can censure it.
36 It should also be kept in mind that the legitimacy of the 
president of the Commission depends on other factors as well, such as the possibility for her or him to 
appoint the other members of the Commission.  
Finally, a direct election of the Commission president could be an alternative. But this does not seem 
to be very attractive to the smaller states, since the results would be determined by more populous and 
thus larger states (which, needless to say, is a mere consequence of the democratic principle; one man 
or woman – one vote). Given the non-existence of a common European demos, it would be difficult to 
persuade the French or British to vote for a Finnish or Irish candidate. Another, different case could be 
presented if pan-European political parties come up with their candidates – which may help to 
overcome the national prism of the candidates. But this situation is still far from reality. The real 
challenge is to build an institutional balance reflecting both the democratic principles and the fact that 
the Union is a union of states. An interesting proposal made by the Convention in this regard is that in 
2009, every member state will have one vote in the Council, according to draft Art. I-24. 
Returning to the current proposal, if it is supposed that it is in the interest of small member states to 
have a strong Commission, then the democratic legitimacy of the Commission needs to be 
strengthened. One way of strengthening the democratic legitimacy would be to give the European 
Parliament the power to elect the president of the Commission as is suggested by the Convention. The 
proposal, though, does not in fact change the position of the European Parliament in this regard other 
than symbolically. The Parliament should at least be presented with several options or a list of 
candidates if the goal is to give the Parliament the power to elect the Commission president.  
Even if it is not more than of a symbolic value to the Parliament, the current proposal may still be 
supported by a number of member states, small as well as large, since the dividing line between the 
member states regarding this issue seems to go between the so-called ‘federalists’ and 
intergovernmentalists. The more federalist-oriented states that are in favour of a strong Commission 
could be supporting the proposal from the Convention for two contradictory reasons – because the 
proposal states that the Parliament (at least in theory) elects the president of the Commission or 
because the proposal in fact does not strengthen the parliamentary control of the Commission and thus 
leaves the Commission independent. The intergovernmentally oriented states may also support the 
proposal because it would still leave the factual power of the election of the Commission president to 
the Council, when nominating the presidential candidate. 
Conclusions 
From what has been said, it seems that the smaller member states should not be very happy with the 
draft Constitution presented at the Thessaloniki summit with respect to the three major issues 
discussed – the permanent president of the European Council, the size and composition of the 
Commission and the election of the Commission president. The permanent Council chair, as suggested 
in the Praesidium proposal will not be much of an asset to the small members nor to the EU as a 
whole. There are also strong arguments in favour of equal representation of member states in the 
Commission rather than creating a two-tier system. With respect to the election of the Commission 
president, the stance of the small states is more divergent and seems to go more along pro-federalist 
versus intergovernmentalist patterns. Most small countries favour enhancing the democratic 
legitimacy of the Commission, but the current proposal is not likely to enhance the democratic 
legitimacy of the president.  
If the smaller member states want to achieve any sensible shift forward in the power-sharing 
mechanisms of the future Union of 25+, they should advocate more ambitious and perhaps even more 
provocative proposals than they have done so far. The Convention tabled its proposal to the 
Thessaloniki European Council and its chairman, Valéry Giscard d´Estaing suggested that no 
substantial questions should be reopened at the IGC. This idea was well supported by some member 
states, notably France and Germany, who worked hard to reach a compromise on institutional 
questions. The only chance for the smaller states has been to prepare well for the IGC. Given the 
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current distribution of power, they should perhaps coordinate their positions, as most of the points 
discussed are not issues where their interests would diverge dramatically. Despite the fact that some 
attempts to coordinate the positions of ‘like-minded countries’ constantly appear (e.g. the Prague 
meeting at the beginning of September), the small countries do not want this group to appear as an 
institutionalised or coordinated body. If, however, no coordinated position of the small countries 
appears, the whole battle is likely to end up at the horse-trading at the upcoming IGC. If the small 
countries do not succeed, they risk that the current ‘tyranny of the Small’ will become a ‘directoire of 
the Big’. 
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